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THE FERES DOCTRINE: SHOULD IT CONTINUE
TO BAR FTCA ACTIONS BY SERVICEMEN
WHO ARE INJURED WHILE INVOLVED IN




HE DOCTRINE OF sovereign immunity bars suits
against a government by its citizens unless the govern-
ment consents to be sued.' For many decades, the primary
device used to seek redress for wrongs caused by the United
States government and its employees was the private con-
gressional bill.2 In response to the strain that private bills ex-
erted on its workload,3 Congress passed the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946.' The FTCA provided, with
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979). See generally C. JACOBS, THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE TORT LIABILITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS (1979) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL];
Crabb, The Sovereign Immunto of the States of the United States, 34 N.D.L. REV. 134 (1958);
Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. REV. 383 (1970); Engdahl, Immunio and
Accountabihty For Positive Government Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972).
A private bill is legislation for the special benefit of an individual citizen. BLACK'S
LAW DICTONARY 1076 (5th ed. 1979); W. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
2 (1957). See in/a text and accompanying notes 37-38.
W. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 2-3. See generally Luce, Petty Busness In Congress, 26
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 815 (1932). See inf/a text accompanying notes 37-48.
4 Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842 (1946)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-
2678, 2680 (1976)). See generally Angoff, The Federal Tort Claims Act." A General View, 37
B. U. L. REV. 387 (1957); Fisher, The Federal Tort Claims Act After Five Years, 3 MERCER
L. REV. 263 (1951); Johnson, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Substantive Survey, 6 U.
RICH. L. REV. 65 (1971); Note, The Supreme Court And Tort Claims Act; End of An Enlight-
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twelve express exceptions,5 for a general waiver of sovereign
immunity.6 Since the twelve exceptions did not include
claims by one serviceman for the injuries caused by the negli-
gence of another serviceman, 7 the FTCA seemed to give ser-
vicemen the same protection as private citizens. The
Supreme Court in Feres v. United States,8 however, provided a
judicial exception excluding servicemens' claims under the
FTCA for injuries arising out of activities incident to service.9 In
Fetes the Supreme Court held that "[t]he Government is not
liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to ser-
vicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service. '
This exception, known as the Feres doctrine, has great im-
plications for a nation which as of 1980 had an estimated
2,045,000 active members in its armed forces." In addition
to active personnel there are 30 million veterans 12 that possi-
bly could have claims against the government for injuries
caused by radiation exposure 13 or exposure to chemicals like
agent orange. 4 Furthermore, members of the Armed Forces
are exposed to a host of other possible injuries which range
ened Era?, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 267 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Supreme
Court]; Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947).
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). See ztiJa text accompanying notes 50-62.
Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-A Further Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 22 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 183 (1947); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). See infta text accompanying note 49.
7 Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949); Jefferson v. United States, 77 F.
Supp. 706, 712-13 (D.C. Md. 1948). See infra text accompanying notes 65-87.
* 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See in/ra text accompanying notes 100-125.
* 340 U.S. at 146. See infra text accompanying note 113.
0 340 U.S. at 146.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES, TABLE 614, at 376 (1980) (data from the United States Office
of Management and the Budget).
", Id. TABLE 638, at 383 (data from the U.S. Veteran's Administration).
13 See H. ROSENBURG, ATOMIC SOLDIER (1980); DeDominicis, Atomic Vets Take Their
Case to Court, 2 CAL. LAw. June 6, 1982, at 28; Favish, Radiation Injuy and The Atomic
Veteran,- Shifiing the Burden of Proof on Factual Causation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 933 (1981). See
in/ra text accompanying notes 263-282.
I- See In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Yannacone, Agent Orange As A Problem OfLaw and Pohly, 77 Nw. UL.
REV. 48 (1982); Note, Product Qyality and Safety-Occupational Safety and Health-Agent
Orange- In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 46 (1981).
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from an army surgeon's negligence during an opertion 15 to
unsafe living quarters. 16 The application of the Feres doctrine
has been far from uniform. 7 As a result of this uneven appli-
cation many courts and commentators have asked for a re-
evaluation of the Fetes doctrine and the policies behind it.'8
This comment will review the development of the Feres doc-
trine and examine the policies supporting it in order to sug-
gest an answer to the question: Should the Feres doctrine
continue to bar FTCA actions by servicemen who are injured
while engaged in activities incident to their service?
In For examples see inf/a text accompanying notes 65-66, 88-90, 127-130.
For example see inf/a text accompanying notes 96-107.
For examples see infa text accompanying notes 251-299. See Harten v. Coons,
502 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1974), where a serviceman brought an action under the
FTCA for negligently performed vasectomy. The court stated that the serviceman's
claim depends on his " 'status' at the time of the injury." Id. at 1365. The court held
that the serviceman was on active duty when injury occurred and therefore was barred
from bringing suit under the FTCA. Id at 1365; Hale v. United States, 452 F.2d 668
(6th Cir. 1971), where a serviceman was injured while returning to the base from a
valid pass when ordered by the military police into their truck after the MP's had
observed plaintiff hitchhiking. The court held plaintiff barred from an FTCA action
because he had "re-entered a direct disciplinary relationship with his army command."
Id at 669.; Hall v. United States, 451 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1971), where plaintiff's alleged
injury was caused by the negligence of an army doctor. The court states that "Feres
required no nexus between discipline and injury." Id at 354.
m See Jocaby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 128 (1969); Rhodes, The Feres
Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.L. REv. 24 (1976) (Feres should be limited to
cases that occur within the scope of the serviceman's normal duty assignment); Note,
The Effect of the Feres Doctrine on Tort Actions Against the United States by Family Members of
Servicemen, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241 (1982) (the FTCA should be read broadly to
allow family members of servicemen to recover) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Effect];
Note, From Feres to Stencel Should Milita Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recoveg?, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1979) (Feres is only a judcially created exception to the FTCA
and has no support in the Act's language); Note, Torts Rights of Servicemen Under Federal
Tort Claims Act, 45 N.C. L. REV. 1129 (1967) (must wait for Congress to change Feres);
Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act." A Cause of Action For Servicemen, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 527
(1980) (Feres is not supported by the rationale provided by the Feres court) [hereinafter
cited as Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act]; Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better
Definition of "Incident to Service," 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 485 (1982) (Congress should act
to change Feres and if not the Court should redefine "incident to service" so that it
operates fairly to avoid needless application of Feres); Comment, Malpractice Protection for
Ailitary Personnel and the Feres Doctrine: Constitutional Tension for the Militaty Plaintifl? 12
U.S.F.L. REV. 525 (1978) (examination of Feres' application to military medical mal-
practice which indicates that Feres does not violate the equal protection or the due
process clauses of the Constitution).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Sovereign Immunity - Its Development In The United States
The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in England
during the 13th century.' 9 The doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity was transplanted to the American political system dur-
ing the formation of our republic.20  Alexander Hamilton
wrote that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of the sovereignty
not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without [the
sovereign's] consent." '2 1
The Supreme Court in 1793 expressed a very different view
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia .22
In Chisholm, the state of Georgia was sued for damages result-
ing from its failure to pay for war supplies received in 1777.23
The Court, in a four to one decision, decided that a state
could be sued without that state's consent. 24 Reaction to the
Court's decision in Chiszholm led to the passage of the eleventh
amendment. 25 The eleventh amendment provides that "[t]he
,' See C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 5-8; ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 1, at 1. The
doctrine of sovereign immunity as it developed in England meant that the courts could
not hear an action against the king. The doctrine was reflected in the adage that "the
king can do no wrong." The doctrine actually was a jurisdictional principle which was
based on the assumption that the courts had no jurisdiction over the king because they
were his creation and subject to his will. Id Nevertheless, remedies and procedures that
allowed citizens to bring suits against the government developed. See generally Hol-
sworth, The Htstoy of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 LAW Q. REV. 141 (1922), for a
review of the remedies that developed in England to redress the wrongs committed by
the Crown.
- ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 1, at 1.
21 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (A. Hamilton)(C. Ressiter ed. 1961), quoted t'n
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 1, at 1.
2 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
2. C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 47. The facts of Chisholm v. Georgia were not officially
reported at the time of the case. The contract under which the merchant supplied the
goods required for payment of 63,605 pounds in South Carolina currency which was
never paid. Id
24' 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 479. There was no majority opinion, as each of five justices,
Iredell, Blair, Wilson, Cushing, and Chief Justice Jay, wrote separate opinions. Id. at
429, 449, 453, 466, 469. A default judgment was entered against the state for failing to
appear by the first day of the next term as the court had ordered. The state, however,
settled the claim within a year. C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 55.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; W. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 1. There are two theories
that explain why the eleventh amendment was passed. First, the passage reaffirmed a
general understanding that existed at the Constitutional convention. The understand-
ing was that the states were immune from suits by private individuals despite the pro-
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judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. '26
In 1834, the Supreme Court confronted for the first time
the issue of whether sovereign immunity applied to the fed-
eral government in United States v. Clarke.27 Clarke sued the
United States seeking to quiet title to some 16,000 acres of
land in Florida, which he had received under a grant from
the Spanish government before Florida was ceded to the
United States in 1819.28 Chief Justice John Marshall, writing
for the Court, stated that "[a]s the United States are not sua-
ble of common right, the party who institutes such suit must
bring his case within the authority of some act of Congress, or
the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it." 29
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Clarke holding in United
States v. McLemore,3° stating that "the government is not liable
to be sued, except with its own consent, given by law."'3 1
Thus, the holdings reached in Clarke and McLemore indicated
that sovereign immunity applied to the federal government
without providing an explanation of policies supporting its
application to the federal government. 2  In 1869, the
Supreme Court, nearly twenty-five years after McLemore,
finally attempted to justify the application of sovereign im-
munity to the federal government.3 The Court stated that
"[t]he principal is fundamental [as] applie[d] to every sover-
eign power, and but for the protection it affords, the govern-
ment would be unable to perform the various duties for
vision in article III granting federal jurisdiction to controversies between a state and
citizens of another state. C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 67. The second theory is that the
states feared that they might have to pay large debts to non-citizen creditors. Id at 68.
- U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that
suits by citizens of a state against that state also required the consent of the state).
2, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
2R Id at 436-37.
- Id at 443-44. The Court did find a specific congressional act that authorized the
suit, and it placed title in Clarke's name. Id. at 463-68.
45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
' Id at 288.
32 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 463-68; 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 287-89.
1 Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122.
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which it was created. '3 4  In 1907, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes explained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was based on the "logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends. 3
5
B. Development of the Federal Tort Claims Act
Despite the fact that sovereign immunity is a doctrine that
is well established in the American political system, methods
developed by which the federal government addressed pri-
vate claims.3 6  For example, as early as 1792, private bills
could be introduced in Congress to satisfy the claims of pri-
vate individuals.37 As the nation grew, however, Congress'
duties also grew; and private bills to remedy the wrongs com-
mitted by the federal government constituted a mounting
burden on the time and energy of the Congress. 8
In 1861, President Lincoln requested Congress to devise a
more convenient way to handle claims against the federal
government.3 9 He stated that "[i]t is as much the duty of the
Government to render prompt justice against itself in favor of
its citizens as it is to administer the same between private
individuals. ' ' 4 In 1855, Congress established the Court of
Claims, which provided citizens with a forum to sue the
United States on claims arising under government contracts
or federal law."
Id at 126.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
W. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 2-5.
Id at 2. The first private bill for a tort claim was granted to an individual for
damages to his home when federal troops occupied it. The bill became effective April
13, 1792. Id
- Id. at 3 n.7.
31 Id. at 3.
Id
4 Act of February 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (codified at various sections of 28
U.S.C. (1976)). See W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS & I. BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF CLAIMS- A HISTORY - PART II (1978). The original bill provided the
Court of Claims with nationwide jurisdiction over claims founded on any law of Con-
gress, any regulation of the executive department and any contract, expressed or im-
plied, with the United States government. The Court of Claims could also hear claims
referred to it by either the House or Senate. Id at 96.
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Nearly one hundred years later, Congress passed the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which established a more con-
venient process for handling claims against the United States
arising under tort law. The FTCA was the culmination of
over two decades of unsuccessful action by Congress to re-
move sovereign immunity as a bar to recovery by private in-
dividuals for injuries and damages caused by the tortious acts
of the federal government and its employees. 3 Passage of the
FTCA resulted from the culmination of four factors.44 First,
Congress, in the interest of justice, desired a scheme that
would allow a private citizen to satisfy his legal claims for
injury and damage suffered because of tortious actions of a
government employee acting within the scope of his employ-
ment.4 5 Second, Congress desired to reduce the burden im-
posed on it by the thousands of private bills requesting relief
from the tortious acts of government employees.46 Third,
Congress perceived an advantage to both the claimant and
the government in providing an impartial judicial forum that
could discover the facts.47 Finally, Congress desired a scheme
which would expedite the payment of just claims. 8
The FTCA provides for a general waiver of sovereign im-
munity by granting the district courts exclusive jurisdiction
over civil claims against the United States which:
accru[e] on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of
property or personal injury or death caused by the negligence
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
42 Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-422, 60 Stat. 842 (1946)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-
2678, 2680 (1976)). See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
.:, See Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutog Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 2
(1946). There were fifteen separate tort claims bills introduced in Congress starting
with the 69th Congress and ending with the 74th Congress. No tort claims bills were
introduced in the 75th Congress, but tort claims bills were introduced every Congress
thereafter until the 79th Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. Id
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private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred
49
The FTCA's general waiver of sovereign immunity is limited
by several enumerated exceptions.5 ° Among the most impor-
tant exceptions are those which relate to discretionary func-
tions,5' intentional torts,52 combatant activities,53 and claims
arising in foreign countries.54 The discretionary function ex-
ception to the FTCA excludes any claim that:
- 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
- 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
n, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). The two primary United States Supreme Court cases
dealing with the discretionary exception to the FTCA are Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953) and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). In
Dalehite, plaintiffs were injured in the explosion of an ammonium nitrate fertilizer
container aboard a ship. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 17. The container was under the control
of the United States and was part of its program to ship fertilizer to Europe after the
war to increase food supplies. Id at 19. The Court excluded the claims under the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA. Id. at 44. In Indian Towing, the Coast
Guard was held to be accountable to plaintiff for its negligent operation of a light-
house. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 70. The Court did not apply the discretionary func-
tion exception, stating that once the Coast Guard had undertaken the operation of the
lighthouse it was required to exercise due care in its operation. Id at 69. See generally
Harris, Federal Tort Claims Act." Discretiona Function Exception Revtiitied, 31 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 161 (1976); Note The Discretionay Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
42 ALB. L. REV. 721 (1978).
52 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). See United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
The Court held the Federal Housing Administration was not liable for a negligently
prepared inspection and appraisal report that induced plaintiff to pay in excess of the
fair market value. Id at 711. The Court held that the intentional tort exception for
misrepresentation applied even though the misrepresentation was the result of negli-
gence. Id at 706-07. See also Redmon v. United States, 528 F.2d 811 (7th Cir.
1975)(SEC officials were not liable when they permitted plaintiff to be defrauded by a
con-man because the misrepresentation exception was applied); Fitch v. United States,
513 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir.) (action for wrongful induction into the armed forces was held
barred by the misrepresentation exception), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Hoesl v.
United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (when psychiatrist employed by the
United States negligently reported that the plaintiff was suffering a mental disability,
plaintiff's action was barred on the exception for defamation). See genera/ly Boger, The
Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment.. An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L.
REV. 497 (1976).
r,, 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1976). See Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.
1948)(action for damages to clam farm barred under the combatant activities excep-
tion because damages had occurred in 1945 as the result of naval ships leaking oil into
Discovery Bay in Washington).
- 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1976). See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949)
(airbase on long term lease to United States is a foreign country); Straneri v. United
States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Penn. 1948) (injuries suffered by merchant seaman when
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[is] based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Gov-
ernment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid,
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.55
The exception for discretionary functions has been the sub-
ject of much litigation.5 6 Some courts have limited the discre-
tionary exception to basic policy decisions involving planning
level activities.5 ' Nevertheless, there appears to be "little con-
crete guidance in locating the lower limit" 58 on planning ac-
tivities beyond which the government will be held liable.59
The exception for intentional torts bars an FTCA action for
claims "arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with con-
tract rights."'  The combatant activities exception applies to
"any claim arising out of combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard during time of war."'6'
The exceptions for claims occurring in a foreign country
mean that the tort must have been committed within the
he was struck by a ear driven by a United States army officer in Chant, Belgium is
excluded under the foreign country exception).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)(1976).
'6 See generally ArrORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 1, at 43; supra note 48 and accom-
panying text. See also Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975) (negligent
handling of airplane hijacking by FBI); Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d
Cir.) (negligent operation of airport control tower not protected by discretionary ex-
ception), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); Estrada v. Hills, 401 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill.
1975) (mismanagement of government property).
57 ATrORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 1, at 43; Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, 373 F.2d
227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967). Where the United States decided to
establish and operate air traffic control system, the court held that action under the
FTCA was barred by discretionary function exception because it was a policy decision
that was the exercise of discretion at the planning level. Id
- Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Penn. 1978) ("the critical in-
quiry [in deciding the applicability of the discretionary function exception is] not
whether judgment was exercised but also whether the nature of the judgment called
for policy considerations'.
SId.
' 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1976).
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United States or its possessions and territories.62 Despite
these and other exceptions, the FTCA has produced a large
volume of suits against the United States.63 At this time there
are over three thousand FTCA suits pending before the fed-
eral courts and the total damages sought have approached
the five billion dollar mark.64
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE FTCA TO CLAIMS BY
MILITARY PERSONNEL
A. The Early Cases
In 1948,Jeferson v. United States65 became the first case to
address the application of the FTCA to military personnel.
The plaintiff inJefferson brought a FTCA action against the
government because of the alleged negligence of an army
doctor in leaving a towel inside the plaintiff after a gall blad-
der operation.66 The district court found that the traditional
exceptions67 to the FTCA were not present. 6' The district
court, however, recognized that there was an implied excep-
tion based on the special relationship which had traditionally
existed between the government and the members of its
armed forces. 69  The district court also observed that the
FTCA repealed section 223b of the Military Claims Act
(MCA),7" which had authorized the Secretary of the Army to
decide and settle any claims not exceeding one thousand dol-
lars which were caused by "military personnel or civilian em-
,2 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1976).
-' 1 L. JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY-HANDLING FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS § 3 (1982)
(general review of FTCA procedures).
" Id.
6 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948), aftd, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), afd sub noa.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See generally Buchert, Torts-Federal Tort
Claims Act Excludes Claims Made By Member of Armed Forces of the United States For Service
Connected Injuries Sustained While in Such Service, 35 GEO. L.J. 125 (1948); Note, Torts-
Federal Tort Claims Act ?:ight ofServicemen To Sue, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 357 (1949).
- 77 F. Supp. at 708.
' See supra text accompanying notes 50-62.
77 F. Supp. at 712.
69 Id at 712-14.
70 Pub. L. No. 112, 57 Stat. 372 (1943)(repealed in 1946 by section 424(a) of the
FTCA).
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ployees of the Department of the Army. "71 The plaintiff
argued that this repeal of section 223b of the MCA, which
recognized military claims, was evidence of such claims being
thereafter covered comprehensively by the provisions of the
FTCA.72 The government, however, argued that repeal of
section 223b of the MCA indicated a general policy determi-
nation by Congress "not to recognize claims by military per-
sonnel for injuries occurring incident to their service, other
than through pensions or Veterans disability allowances.
'7 3
The district court agreed with the government's position that
the policy of Congress was not to provide for servicemen
other than through the general statutory provisions for pen-
sions and veterans benefits.74
The United States Supreme Court, in 1949, first addressed
the issue of whether the FTCA should apply to military per-
sonnel in Brooks v. United States. 7 In Brooks, two brothers and
their father were riding in a car when it collided with an
United States Army truck.76 One brother died and the other
brother and their father were seriously injured.77 The district
court found that the driver of the truck was negligent. 78 The
government, however, moved to dismiss the claims as to the
two brothers, arguing that both of the brothers were mem-
bers of the armed services at the time of the accident.7 9 The
government contended the brothers should be barred from
recovery despite the fact they were on furlough at the time of




75 337 U.S. 49 (1949). See generally Note, Recovery for "Service Incident" Injuries Under the
Federal Tort Cla,'ns Act, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1950); Note, Legislation-Federal Tort
Claims Act-Applicable to Military Personnel, 48 MICH L. REV. 534 (1950); Note, Torts-
Federal Tort Clains Act--Serviemen's Suits, 28 N.C.L. REV. 137 (1949); Note, Federal Tort
Claims Act- Military Personnel-Right ofAction When Injury is Non-Incident to Service, 24
TUL. L. REV. 249 (1949).
,6 337 U.S. at 50.
7 Id.
- United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1948); See generally Note,
Torts-Appiation ofFederal Tort Claims Act To Claims By Soldiers, 20 Miss. L.J. 396
(1949); Note, Torts-Construction of the Federal Tort Claims Act--Sldiers Excluded as a
Class, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 106 (1949).
,q 337 U.S. at 50.
1983]
188 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
the accident.80 The district court denied the motion to dis-
miss,"' but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, citingJeffer-
son, reversed.82
The Supreme Court, however, was not persuaded that
"any claim" meant "any claim but that of servicemen."8 3
The Court noted that among the expressed exceptions to the
FTCA was the combatant activities exception and stated "it
would be absurd to believe that Congress did not have ser-
vicemen in mind in 1946, when this statute [FTCA] was
passed."'8 4 The Court further stated that "the overseas and
combatant activities exceptions make this plain."85 Thus, the
Supreme Court stated that the plaintiffs' actions "were well
founded. 8a6 In dicta, the Court noted that had the accident
occurred while the brothers were not on furlough, "a wholly
different case would be presented.
87
In Griggs v. United States88 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit was "asked to decide [the] question directly
presented and decided in Ve/ffrson] and discussed but not de-
cided in [Brooks]",8 9 namely whether the FTCA bars claims
by servicemen injured incident to their service. In Grzggs an
army officer's death was caused by an army doctor's alleged
negligently performed surgery.90
The plaintiff, executrix of the army officer's estate, brought
a wrongful death action against the United States under the
FTCA.91 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
169 F.2d at 841.
' 337 U.S. at 50. The court denied the motion and awarded $25,425 to the deceased
brother's estate and $4,000 to the surviving brother. Id
82 169 F.2d at 845-46.
- 337 U.S. at 51.
- Id
8 Id.
Id at 54. The Court did remand the case to determine whether the amounts re-
ceived under the FTCA should be adjusted by the amounts received under the pension
and compensation acts. Id.
8, Id. at 52. See infra text accompanying notes 96-137.
178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub noma, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950).
-9 Id at 1-2.
- Id at 2.
, Id.
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district court's dismissal of the action.92 The court considered
theJefferson holding but stated "[we] fail to find anything in
the context of the Act [FTCA] or its legislative history justify-
ing judicial limitation upon the claims of servicemen."93
The court concluded that, based on the Brooks rationale, only
one of the twelve expressed exceptions could bar this claim
under the FTCA.94 Additionally, the court found persuasive,
as pointed out in Brooks,9 that there were eighteen tort claims
bills introduced in Congress prior to the passage of the FTCA
and sixteen of them contained exceptions excluding service-
men's claims. 96 Nevertheless, the court noted that when the
FTCA was passed it contained no provision excluding ser-
vicemen's claims. 97 The court of appeals stated that "the
only logical" explanation for this was that Congress deliber-
ately kept from excluding servicemen's claims under the
FTCA.98 The court concluded that if dire results were to fol-
low from allowing servicemen to file FTCA actions, then it
"[was] for Congress and not [the] Court to provide rational
limitations. 99
B. The Wholly Diffrent Case - Feres v. United States
A "wholly different case," Feres v. United States, 'o reached
the Supreme Court in 1950.1 1 Feres was actually the consoli-
dation of three cases. 112 First, in Feres v. United States, 103 a ser-
92 Id at 3.
"Id
"Id
9r, 337 U.S. at 51-52.




- 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See supra text accompanying notes 8-18. See generally Jones,
Legislation-Right of Members of The Armed Forces To Recover Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 502 (1951); Zanard, Torts-The Government Is Not Liable Under
The Federal Tort Claims Act for Injuries to Servicemen Arising Out Of Or In The Course of
Activity Incident to Miitag Service, 39 GEO. L.J. 508 (1951); Note, Federal Tort Claims
Act-Liability of the Government to Service for Injuries Incident to Service, 99 U. PA. L. REV.
1022 (1951).
- 340 U.S. at 135.
1O2 Id.
, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949).
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viceman died in a fire that destroyed his barracks while he
was on active duty.10 4 The complaint alleged that the United
States was negligent for housing servicemen in barracks
known to be unsafe due to a defective heating plant.'0 5 The
district court dismissed the action, and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.'°6 The second case was Jefferson v.
United States,' °7 where the district court found an implied ex-
ception excluding servicemen's claims under the FTCA °8
and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed." °9 The
third case was Grzggs v. United States,"' where the district
court dismissed the complaint,"' but the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, after considereing Brooks and Jefferson, re-
versed the lower court, holding that the plaintiff had a cause
of action under the FTCA." 2
The United States Supreme Court in Feres, considering
whether the FTCA applied to servicemen on active duty,
held that the "[g]overnment is not liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to serv-
ice.""' 3 The Court based its holding on three distinct factors.
First, the Court reviewed the FTCA's language, which states
that "[t]he United States shall be liable . . . in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances . . . .,,1 The Court noted that Congress
did not enact the FTCA to create a new cause of action, but
rather to remove sovereign immunity as a bar to existing
,1- 177 F.2d at 536.
0 Id
"' Id. at 536-38.
,o7 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949). See supra text accompanying notes 65-74.
' See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
'09 178 F.2d at 520.
110 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949). See supra text accompanying notes 88-99. See gener-
ally Himes, Torts-Federal Tort Claims Act Permits Action Against the United States by Execu-
tnx of Serviceman Who Was Killed Through Negligence of Army Surgeons While on Active Duty
But Not Combat Duty, 38 GEO. L.J. 508 (1950).
.. 178 F.2d at 2.
,,2 Id at 3. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99.
340 U.S. at 146.
Id at 141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). See supra text accompanying note 49.
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causes of action in tort. " 5 The Court noted that the plaintiffs
could point to "no liability of a private individual even re-
motely analogous to that which they [plaintiffs] are asserting
against the United States."' 16 The Court observed that no
American court had permitted "a soldier to recover for negli-
gence, against either his superior officers or the Government
[incident to his service].""' 7 The Court found that there could
be no analogy to private individuals because no private indi-
vidual has the power to form and maintain an army and
therefore such a cause of action did not exist before the pas-
sage of FTCA." 8
The Court also noted that the FTCA requires the law of
the state where the "act or omission occurred" to govern the
liability." 9 The Court, however, reasoned that the Govern-
ment's relationship with its armed forces is "distinctively fed-
eral in character."' 2 ° Thus, the Court concluded that since a
serviceman has no control over where he is stationed, it
makes no sense that the "geography of an injury should select
the law to be applied.' ' 2 1
Second, the Court found that it could not "escape attribut-
ing some weight to the various enactments by Congress which
provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensa-
tion for injuries or death of those in the armed services.' '1 22
The Court suggested four alternative methods for handling
dual claims under the FTCA and the other various military
.. 340 U.S. at 141. See infra text accompanying notes 152-155.
- 340 U.S. at 141. See Goldstein v. State, 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939) (plain-
tiff injured while actively serving state militia but state not held liable despite its
waiver of sovereign immunity).
... 340 U.S. at 141-42.
'B I'd
Id at 142-43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
,2 340 U.S. at 143. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 301-02
(1947), where the United States brought an action for indemnity for losses caused due
to injury to a serviceman by a third party. The Court stated that the government-
soldier relationship was distinctively and exclusively a creation of federal law and no
reason existed to vary the government's rights by applying the various states' laws. Id
at 305-06. See Note, The Federal Torts Claims Act, supra note 18 at 544-45.
1' 340 U.S. at 143. See infia text accompanying notes 149-154.
22 340 U.S. at 144.
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compensation and pension schemes. 123  Nevertheless, the
Court found persuasive the fact that the FTCA lacked any
provisions for adjusting possible amounts received under a
FTCA suit, if allowed, by the amounts, if any, received under
the pension and compensation acts.1 24 Due to the lack of an
adjustment procedure, the Court concluded that Congress
was not aware that the "[FTCA] might be interpreted to per-
mit recovery for injuries incident to military service" because
if Congress had been aware then it would have provided for
such adjustments. 125
Finally, the Court in United States v. Brown 126 expressly ar-
ticulated that military discipline was the primary premise for
its decision in Feres.127 In Brown the plaintiff suffered a knee
injury which led to an honorable discharge. 128 Following the
discharge the plaintiff underwent two operations on his knee
at a Veterans Administration Hospital. 29 During the second
operation a defective tourniquet caused permanent damage
to the nerves in the plaintiffs leg.' 3 ° The Supreme Court
agreed to hear the case to resolve the issue of whether
Brooks' 3' or Feres132 applied. 133  The Court held that the
12:1 Id. First, the Court said the claimant could enjoy the amount accorded under the
FTCA in addition to amounts paid under the acts providing for injuries to servicemen.
Second, the Court said that the claimant could elect between the FTCA and other
available provisions. Third, the Court said that the claimant could be allowed to take
the larger recovery less a credit for other amounts received under the various provi-
sions. Finally, the Court stated that the compensation and pension provisions could be
considered the sole remedy for servicemen injured while on active duty. Id.
124 Id See supra note 86 and accompanying text; infa text accompanying notes 127-
137.
340 U.S. at 144.
348 U.S. 110 (1954). See generally Review, Veterans-Rght of Veteran to Sue Under the
Tort Claims Actfor Negligence of Veterans Hospital, 41 A.B.A. J. 162 (1955); Note, Torts-
Veterans Compensation- Concurrent Remedy Under Federal Tort Claims Act Allowed, 29 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 318 (1955).




See supra text accompanying notes 75-87.
12 See supra text accompanying notes 96-125.
.. 348 U.S. at 11. See generally Cantey, Torts-Recovey By Veteran Under The Tort
Claims Act, 17 GA. B.J. 412 (1955); Note, Tort Suit May Be Maintained Against United
States Under Tort Claims Act for Injury Caused by Negligent Treatment of Veteran Admitted to
Government Hospital, 40 VA. L. REv. 634 (1954).
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Brooks rationale applied because the injury occurred after the
plaintiff's discharge, and thus, the plaintiff was neither on ac-
tive duty nor subject to military discipline. 134 The Court
stated that "[t]he Feres decision did not disapprove of the
Brooks case,"' 35 but rather, "merely distinguished it.' 3 6 The
Court explained the rationale of Fetes, stating that:
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on disci-
pline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under
the Tort Claims Act [FTCA] were allowed for negligent or-
ders given or negligent acts committed in the course of mili-
tary duty, led the Court [in Fetes] to read that Act [FTCA] as
excluding claims of that character. 137
C. The Later Cases - Further Explanation of the Feres
Rationale
Since Brown, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity
to explain the rationale behind Feres four times. First was
United States v. Munz, 13 a consolidation of two cases brought
by two federal prisoners because of injuries they received dur-
ing their confinement in federal prison.' 39 The Court, after
carefully reviewing the legislative history of the FTCA,"4 ° de-
termined that Congress intended to permit federal prisoners
to sue under the Act. 4' The government had argued that
there was an implied exception excluding federal prisoners




33, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). See generally Roswig, Torts-Federal Prisoners May Sue Under
Federal Tort Claims Act, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 124 (1963); Note, Torts-Neglgence Actions
By Federal Prisoners Allowed Under The Federal Tort Claimi Act, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 177
(1963).
,.9 Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962); Winston v. United States
305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally Talcott, The Federal Tort Claims Act Allows A
Federal Prtoner To Recover From The United States For Injuries Resulting From The Negligence
of Prison Oftials, 51 GEO. L.J. 195 (1962); Note, Adminstrative Law: Torts Federal Tort
Claims Act. Prisoner Suits, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 525 (1963); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-
Recovery by Federal Prisoner for Negligence of Prison Employees, 16 VAND. L. REV. 236 (1962).
-o 374 U.S. at 152-58.
141 Id
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from using the FTCA under the rationale of Feres.'42
The Supreme Court examined the reasons behind the
holding in Feres and applied them to federal prisoners.143
First, it considered the lack of analogous or parallel liability
in the private context.' 4' The Court stated that "[t]he govern-
ment's liability is no longer restricted to circumstances in
which government bodies have traditionally been responsible
for misconduct of their employees",145 rather "[the FTCA]
extends to novel and unprecedented forms of liability as
well."' 46 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for
the Court, found that analogous forms of liability existed. 147
The Chief Justice noted that several states had allowed pris-
oners to recover against prison employees or the state
directly. 148
The Supreme Court further considered the consequences of
subjecting federal prisoners to various state laws under the
FTCA provision that the law of the state where the act or
omission occurs is the law to be applied in deciding liabil-
ity. 149 It recognized that variations of state law might ham-
per the "uniform administration of federal prisons,"'5 0 but
nevertheless the Court concluded that there were no "con-
crete examples" of how applying the various states' tort law
would affect the prison system.' 5 ' The Court added that
"[e]ven a matter such as improper medical treatment can be
judged under the varying state laws of malpractice without
violent dislocation of prison routine.' 52 The government
had argued that applying different states' tort law as required
by the FTCA would prejudice the federal prisoners by sub-
jecting them to varying standards even though they have no
". Id at 159.
.. Id at 159-64.
Id. at 159. See supra text accompanying notes 115-116.
14, 374 U.S. at 139.
11'; Id.
147 Id.
"4 Id at 159-60.
,41 Id See supra text accompanying notes 119-121.
"- 374 U.S. at 161.
- Id
112 Id. at 162.
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control over their location. 153 The Court, however, pointed
out that denying recovery altogether would be even a greater
prejudice.' 54
Next, the Supreme Court considered the second rationale
of Feres, availability of compensation and pension payments
to which servicemen are entitled under various acts of Con-
gress.'5 The Court referred to Brown as an example of al-
lowing a veteran to file an FTCA suit despite the fact that he
also was eligible for benefits under the Veteran's Benefit
Act. 156 The Court, however, noted that federal prisoners, un-
like servicemen, do not have compensation and pension bene-
fits available to them. 157  Thus, the availability of
compensation and pension plans was not a factor when con-
sidering federal prisoners' ability to sue under the FTCA. 1 8
Finally, the Court discussed what it said "best explained"
the Feres decision, the need for military discipline. 159 The
Court, with this determining factor in mind, considered the
effects which allowing FTCA suits by federal prisoners would
have on prison discipline.160 The Court noted that FTCA ac-
tions by federal prisoners against the government were sub-
ject to the discretionary function 16 1 or the intentional tort 16 2
exceptions provided in the FTCA itself.163 Thus, the Court
concluded that the government would be protected by these
exceptions in many of the actions brought by federal prison-
ers. 164 Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the "Fed-
eral Rules of Procedure are not so inflexible that clearly
frivolous suits need embarrass prison officials or burden the
United States Attorney's offices."' 65 Chief Justice Warren,
"Id
154 Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 122-125.
374 U.S. at 160. See supra text accompanying notes 127-137.
, 374 U.S. at 160.
'58 Id.
,, Id at 162. See supra text accompanying notes 127-137.
374 U.S. at 163.
'6' Id See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
,62 Id. See supra text accompanying note 60.
,, Id. See supra text accompanying note 55-60.
374 U.S. at 164.
6 Id
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therefore, concluded that prison discipline, unlike military
discipline, would not be adversely affected by allowing fed-
eral prisoners to bring suits under the FTCA. 1
66
In 1977 the United States Supreme Court again discussed
the Feres decision in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States. 6 7 In Sencel, a national guard pilot was permanently
injured when the ejection system of his F-100 jet fighter mal-
functioned. 68 The pilot was awarded a lifetime pension of
$1500 per month under the Veteran's Benefit Act.' 69 The pi-
lot later brought suit against Stencel, the manufacturer of the
ejection system, and the United States under the FTCA."7 °
Stencel cross-claimed for indemnity from the United States,
alleging that the government had provided faulty specifica-
tions for the ejection equipment' 7' and that the United States
at all times after manufacture had exclusive control and cus-
tody of the ejection system.1 72 The government, citing Feres,
moved for summary judgment against both the pilot's FTCA
claim and Stencel's cross-claim.173 The district court granted
the motion, 74 which the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 75 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the conflict between the circuit courts on the issue of
whether Feres bars third party indemnity claims against the
United States arising out of injuries to servicemen during ac-
tivities "incident to service. ' 176
6~Id
431 U.S. 666 (1977). See generally Krotseng, The Supreme Court And The Tort Claims
Acty End Of An Enlightened Era?, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 267 (1978); Note, Stencel Aero
Engineerng Corporation v. United States.- An Expansion of The Feres Doctrine To Include Miltaly
Contractors, Subcontractors and Suppliers, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1217 (1978).
" 431 U.S. at 666.
,19 Id at 668. For pertinent provision of the Veteran's Benefits Act see 38 U.S.C.
§ 321 (1976), 32 U.S.C. § 318 (1976).




" Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976).
1,6 431 U.S. at 66-67. For example, see United Air Lines v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379,
404 (9th Cir.) (Feres does not allow third party indemnity claims), cert. dismissed, 379
U.S. 951 (1964); Adams v. General Dynamics Corp., 535 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir. 1976)
(United States must be liable to plaintiff for third party indemnity claim to be al-
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The Supreme Court examined the three factors that sup-
ported the holding in Feres and applied those factors to third
party indemnity claims. 177 The Court, considering the appli-
cation of varying states' laws to third party indemnity claims
involving servicemen injured incident to their service, stated
that "[t]he relationship between the government and its sup-
pliers of ordinance is certainly no less distinctively federal in
character"'' 78 than the relationship between the government
and servicemen. 179 The Court noted that the military has a
national scope involving frequent moves of large numbers of
personnel and equipment around the country, creating a sig-
nificant risk that accidents or injuries might occur. 80 Thus,
the Court concluded that:
[i]f, as the Court held in Feres, it makes no sense to permit the
fortuity of the situs of the alleged negligence to affect the lia-
bility of the Government to a serviceman who sustains serv-
ice-connected injuries . ..[i]t makes equally little sense to
permit that situs to affect the Government's liability to a Gov-
ernment contractor for the identical injury.18 '
The second factor the Court considered was the availabil-
ity of payments under the Veteran's Benefit Act.' 82 It held
that the military compensation scheme provides the upper
limits which the United States should bear for service related
injuries.8 3 The court stated that "to permit [Stencel] to pro-
ceed . . .here would be to judicially admit at the back door
that which has been legislatively turned away at the front
door." 8 4
lowed); Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. United States, 511 F.2d 159, 163 (5th Cir.
1975) (Fetes provides no third party indemnity right); Barr v. Brezina Constr. Co., 464
F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 1972) (the party held liable to serviceman does not in-
herit serviceman's limitation on bringing action against the government), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
, 431 U.S. at 670.
"7 Id at 672.
17q See supra text accompsnying notes 119-121.
431 U.S. at 672.
SId.
112 Id. at 672-73. See supra text accompanying notes 122-125.
431 U.S. at 673.
' Id at 673. See supra text accompanying notes 127-137.
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In consideration of the third factor, the effect that permit-
ting the action would have on military discipline, the Court
stated that allowing Stencel to bring its indemnity action
would have the same effect on military discipline as if the
serviceman had brought the action. 1 5 The Court further
stated that "[t]he trial would, in either case, involve second-
guessing of military orders, and would often require members
of the Armed Services to testify in court as to each other's
decisions and actions."" 6 The Court concluded that second-
guessing of military orders "weighs against permitting any re-
covery by [the] petitioner [Stencel] against the United
States."' 7 Thus, the Court held that third-party indemnity
cases involving servicemen injured incident to service are
barred for the same reasons that the holding in Feres bars di-
rect actions by servicemen injured incident to their service."'R
Finally and most recently, the Court addressed the Feres
doctrine in Chappell v. Wallace. 189 In Chappel several navy en-
listed men brought an action for damages and other relief"9
against their superior officers.1 9 The enlisted men alleged
that their superior officers had discriminated against them on
the basis of race in making duty assignments, performance
evaluations and the impostion of penalties. 92 The district
court dismissed the complaint because it considered the ac-
tions by the superior officers as nonreviewable military deci-
sions.193 Furthermore, the district court found that the
enlisted men had failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies. '"'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, re-




,89 76 L.Ed. 2d 586 (June 13, 1983).
- Id. The enlisted were seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment in ad-
dition to damages. Id
1 .1 Id
02 Id
-9 Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 1981).
,9- Id.
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versed, 95 based on the assumption that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unkonwn Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics 196 authorized the award of
damages for the constitutional violations alleged by the en-
listed men.' 97 The court put forth various tests for deciding
whether the military actions involved were reviewable by a
civilian court and whether if reviewable the superior officers
were immune from suit.198 The court remanded the case
back to the district court for the application of the tests.1 99
The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari. °°
The Supreme Court reversed the actions of the court of
appeals.20 ' The Court recognized that Bivens did authorize a
suit for damages against federal officers who violated an indi-
vidual's constitutional rights.2 °2 The Court, however, noted
that in Bivens it had expressly warned that such a remedy will
not be available when "special factors counseling hesitation"
are present.2 °3 The Court turned to Feres in examining the
"special factors" involved in a Bivens type suit against mili-
tary officers by those under their command. 20 4  The Court
pointed out that military disipline was the primary, if not,
sole concern. 205 The Court stated:
The need for special regulations in relation to military disci-
pline, and the consequent need and justification for a special
and exclusive system of military justice, is too obvious to re-
quire extensive discussion; no military organization can func-
tion without strict discipline and regulation that would be
- Id. at 738.
- 403 U.S. 388 (1972) In Bivens the Court reversed its earlier holding in Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1945) and held that there is a federal cause of action when federal
agents acting under the color of their authority commit constitutional violations. Id at
389. See generally Note, Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents:. A New Dtrection In Federal
Polic Immuni'ty, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 987 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law, 50 TEx L. REV.
798 (1972).
- 661 F.2d at 735-738.
'~Id
Id at 738.
Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 292 (1982).
76 L. Ed. 2d at 594.
-2 Id. at 589.
-3 Id.
Id at 590.
-1 Id (citing U.S. v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150).
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unacceptable in a civil setting.2"6
The court added that "the inescapable demands of military
discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on the
battlefield; the habit of immediate compliance with military
procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time
for debate or reflection. '20 7 The Court in holding that en-
listed military personnel cannot sue superior officers for al-
leged constitutional violations did note Chief Justice
Warren's statement in a 1962 law review article that "our cit-
izens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply
because they have doffed their civilian clothes. '20 8  The
Court added that it had never held nor was it now holding
that servicemen are precluded from all suits in civilian courts
for constitutional violations suffered while in the service. 20 9
IV. EVALUATION OF THE RATIONALE BEHIND FERES
A. Non-Unformy of State Law and Lack of Analogous
Situations
The Court in Feres found that it was illogical to have the
various laws of the states determine liability as required by
the FTCA because servicemen have no control over where
they are stationed.210 That differing state law would produce
inconsistent and different results in identical situations is a
factor that is not disputed.2 I' Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Stencel, stated that:
It is true, of course, that the military performs a unique, na-
tionwide function but so do the Bureau of the Census, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and many other
agencies of the federal government. These agencies, like the
military, may have personnel and equipment in all parts of
the country. Nevertheless, Congress has made private rights
- Id at 590.
207 Id.
Id at 593 (citing E. WARREN, The BillofRights andthe Mihtaly, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
181, 188 (1962)).
29 Id.
2-, 340 U.S. at 143. See supra text accompanying notes 119-121.
21, See genera ly R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAws (1981).
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against the government depend on 'the law of the place where
the act or ommision occurred'. . . and presumably the Court
agrees that this provision governs the rights of suppliers to
nonmilitary agencies. Nothing in the Court's opinion ex-
plains why it concludes that the relationship between the
Government and those suppliers differs from its relationship
to purveyors of military equipment.2" 2
The Supreme Court in Mun'z 213 allowed federal prisoners
to bring actions under the FTCA even though, like service-
men, they had no control over their location. 2 4 The Court
concluded that denying the plaintiffs any recovery would
prejudice them far more than granting a recovery that was
subject to the laws of the various states.21 5 In addition, as one
commentator has noted, "local tort law already applies to
military dependents in suits for damages for physical injuries
incurred independently of any injury to servicemen, even
when these actions depend upon the fortuitous placement of
the serviceman. '21 6 Finally, under the FTCA, the claims of
civilians injured by the military are subject to the law of the
state where the injury occurred. 2 " Thus, the military is sub-
ject to the law of the various states and in suits by servicemen
injured in activities not incident to their service. 2" Because
the military is already subject to the various laws of the states
in determining its liability under the FTCA, for most situa-
tions it makes little sense to exclude servicemen on that
basis.219
The decision in Feres was partly based on the lack of analo-
gous situations in the private sector with which to compare
2 431 U.S. at 675.
213 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
211 Id. at 162. See supra text accompanying notes 149-154.
2, 374 U.S. at 162.
2,6 Note, The Effect, supra note 18, at 1259-60. See, e.g., Bridgford v. United States,
550 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1977); Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446 (D.C.S.C.
1968); Larrabee v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
217 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
21a Note, TheEffect, supra note 18, at 1261. See, e.g., Craft v. United States, 524 F.2d
1250 (5th Cir. 1970) (application of Alabama law); Bissell v. McElligott, 369 F.2d 115
(8th Cir. 1966) (application of Missouri Law); Simpson v. United States, 484 F. Supp.
387 (W.D. Penn. 1980) (application of Pennsylvania law).
2,9 See supra text accompanying notes 215-219.
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the injuries suffered by servicemen incident to their service.22 °
The Court, relying heavily on the fact that no private indi-
vidual could raise and maintain an army, refused to analo-
gize situations involving military doctor and servicemen with
the private doctor and patient or the housing of military per-
sonnel with private landlord and tenant arrangements.2 2 ' In-
stead, the Court considered the circumstance of military
service as a situation complete in itself without taking a closer
look at the individual functions carried out in the service
before comparing it with like circumstances in the private
sector.222 Thus, the Court in Feres was considering the gov-
ernment's status as a sovereign as a separate and total cir-
cumstance when trying to find an appropriate analogy.2 2 3
One commentator has stated that the Feres Court's inter-
pretation that the sovereign status of the United States is a
circumstance to be considered when looking for a like circum-
stance in the private sector frustrates the very purpose of the
FTCA, which was to remove sovereign immunity as a bar to
suits by citizens against the government. 224 He points out
that only four out of forty-eight states had waived sovereign
immunity by 1946; thus, if the FTCA meant to have the
United States' liability determined to the same extent as a
"like sovereign," then only individuals in the four states that
had waived sovereign immunity would be able to sue under
the FTCA.225Individuals in the other states, which had not
waived sovereign immunity, would be barred because the
FTCA applies only to the same extent like sovereigns would
be liable.226 Thus, the Court in Feres is locked into a circular
argument, namely that the FTCA was enacted to remove the
sovereign immunity bar, yet the Court considered this same
sovereign status when looking for an analoguous situation.
2- 340 U.S. at 137-40. See supra text accompanying notes 115-118.
22, Note, The Federal Tort Claiins Act, supra note 18, at 538-39.
222 340 U.S. at 142. Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 539.
22, Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 538-39.
2. Id at 539.
22.5 Id
226 Id
B. The Availabiity of Other Benefits
The Court in Feres also found that the availability of com-
pensation and pension payments under various acts was a
factor that supported its holding which barred servicemen
from the use of the FTCA.227 Justice Marshall in his dissent
in Stencel noted that the Veteran's Benefits Act (VBA) does
not contain any provision declaring that the VBA is the ser-
vicemen's exclusive remedy against the government for injury
or death.228 The Court in Feres reasoned that because the
FTCA contains no adjustment procedure for payments under
various military claims acts, Congress did not and could not
have intended the FTCA to cover servicemen. This implies
that whenever a serviceman is injured, regardless of whether
he is injured incident to his service, his recovery would be
limited to benefits under the VBA. 229 Nevertheless, cases like
Brooks 230 and Brown 231 indicate that servicemen may seek
FTCA remedies in addition to VBA compensation and pen-
sion payments to which they are entitled.232
One commentator has suggested that the Court in Feres ig-
nored Congressional intent.233 In Brooks, the Court stated
that "[w]e are not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any
claim but that of servicemen.' "234 The Court in Feres, how-
ever, indicated that the "any claim" language was unclear,235
but did not provide any explanation for its statement in
Brown 236
Additionally, it has been suggested that the Supreme
Court ignored the rule of statutory construction that "appro-
priate matters not expressly included within the enactment
2' 340 U.S. at 144. See supra text accompanying notes 122-125.
22, 431 U.S. at 675.
229 See Note, The Effect, supra note 18, at 1255.
2- 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949), discussedsupra in text accompanying notes 174-186.
"' 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954), dzscussed supra in text accompanying notes 126-137.
.2 See Note, The Efect, supra note 18, at 549.
2:m Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 54-56.
24 See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
-1m, 340 U.S. at 140-41.
2- Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 549.
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are not to be considered within its scope. 2 37 It has been ar-
gued that because the twelve expressed exceptions to the
FTCA do not exclude claims of servicemen, Congress must
have intended to include servicemen's claims for injuries aris-
ing out of activities incident to their service.238 The Court in
Brooks noted that sixteen of the eighteen torts bills presented
to Congress before the passage of the FTCA contained excep-
tions which excluded servicemen from their provisions.239
Thus Congress was aware of servicemen and their possible
claims under a tort claims act and yet Congress did not in-
clude a servicemen's exception to the FTCA.24 °
C. Mhiarg Discipine
The Supreme Court in Muniz stated that the possible ef-
fects that allowing FTCA suits by servicemen would have on
military discipline was the factor that best explained Feres.24 ,
That discipline is one of the most important factors in any
military organization is beyond debate 242 and something
which the Court pointed out in Chappell.43 Courts and com-
mentators have not been able to agree on what that effect
might be. 244 The Supreme Court in Stencel feared that al-
lowing FTCA action would involve the "second-guessing" of
military orders and the taking of testimony of members of the
armed forces concerning each other's decisions, which would
lead to adverse effects on military discipline.245  The
Supreme Court in Chappell pointed out that the courts were
ill-equipped to decide the impact that "any particular intru-
231 Id This rule of statutory construction was first recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 377 (1933).
2" Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 18, at 550.
-9 337 U.S. at 57.
2-0 See supra text accompanying notes 83-85, 236-240.
24 374 U.S. at 150, 162 (1963), dcussed supra in text accompanying notes 138-166.
24 In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); Rhodes, The Feres Doctrne After 25 Years, 18
A.F.L. REv. 24, 42 (1976).
21 76 L. Ed. 2d at 592-94.
2 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
2' 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977), discussedsupra tn text accompanying notes 167-188. See
supra text accompanying notes 185-187.
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sion upon military authority might have. ' 24 6 Nevertheless,
the pivotal question is to determine the effect that allowing
an FTCA action by a serviceman injured incident to his serv-
ice would have on military discipline.247 Justice Marshall,
dissenting in Stencel, however, noted that when the military's
negligence causes injury to a civilian, there is the "same
chance that a trial would involve second-guessing military or-
ders and would . . . require members of the Armed Services
to testify in courts as to each other's decisions and actions. 248
Justice Marshall went on to state that "[y]et there would be
no basis, in Feres or in the Tort Claims Act for concluding
that the [civilian's suit] [would be] barred because of the na-
ture of the evidence to be produced at [the] trial. ' 249
D. Apphcation of the Feres Doctrine by the Lower Federal Courts
The courts have not approached the application of Feres
and its underlying rationale, the effect on military discipline,
on a uniform basis.251 In Coffe v. UnitedStates25' a serviceman
on his way to off-base liberty was killed in an automobile ac-
cident within the base.252 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the claim citing Feres. 53 The court
concluded that although the serviceman was on his way to an
off-base liberty, he was still physically present on the base
when the accident occurred.254
The Fifth Circuit reached a different result in Parker v.
United States. 255 The plaintiff, an army officer, had decided to
move his family to New Mexico. 256 He requested and re-
ceived permisssion to take a few days to move, his leave com-
-, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 594.
' Note, The Effect, supra note 18 at 1262.
431 U.S. at 676-77 (dissenting opinion).
2 9 Id
2r. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
7,' 324 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D. Cal. 1971),afl'dpercuriam, 455 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1972).
252 Id at 1087.
2,, Id at 1088.
254 Id
25,, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980).
2- Id at 1008.
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mencing at the end of his normal duty shift.2 57 Upon
completing his duty assignment, he left his post and drove
toward the front gate, but before he could get outside the
gate he collided head-on with a military vehicle and was
killed.258 The court allowed the plaintiffs wife to recover on
a wrongful death action under the FTCA.259 The court con-
cluded that Parker's leave was equivalent to the two brothers'
furlough in Brooks260 and therefore was not barred by Feres.
Furthermore, the court said that although Parker's death oc-
curred on a military base, the district court should have
looked at the function that Parker was performing at the time
of his death. 26 ' The court concluded that Parker was not act-
ing incident to his service.262
The courts have recently faced the Feres question in the
context of injuries resulting from servicemen's exposure to ra-
diation. In Monaco v. United States,263 Daniel J. Monoco was
stationed at the University of Chicago from May 1943, to
February 1946, where he participated in a special army train-
ing program.26 The special training program required Mon-
aco to perform calisthentic exercises at the University's
''Id
2'8Id
-" Id. at 1015.
- Id. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
- 611 F.2d at 1011.
-2 Id. at 1015.
wi 661 F.2d 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982). For a case
decided with Monaco, see Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981). In
Broudy, the military ordered a marine officer to participate in military exercises within
the vicinity of two atmospheric nuclear tests conducted in Nevada during the summer
of 1957. Id at 126. The officer left the Marines in 1960, but continued to receive
medical treatment for various health problems at military facilities. Id. In 1976 mili-
tary doctors diagnosed the officer as having cancer due to exposure to low levels of
radiation. Id The officer died of cancer in 1977. The officer's wife attempted to file an
FTCA action alleging that her husband was negligently exposed to radiation by the
military. Id The court dismissed on the basis of the Feres doctrine, but the court stated
that if the wife could "allege and prove an independent, post-service negligent act on
the part of the government her claim would be cognizable under the FTCA." Id at
128-29. The court suggested that the government's failure to monitor and warn the
officer of the possible injuries due to radiation exposure might constitute an actionable
post-service claim provided that the government became aware of the dangers of radia-
tion exposure after the officer left the service. Id at 128-29.
Id at 130.
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football field.265 During this time the United States govern-
ment was conducting experiments in atomic reactions in an
underground laboratory located beneath the football field. 66
The experiments were part of the "Manhattan Project,"
which developed the world's first atomic weapons.267 In July
of 1971, Monaco was informed that he had contracted radia-
tion-induced cancer of the colon 26' and that radiation was
also responsible for a birth defect in his daughter known as
arterio-venous anomaly of the brain. 69
Monaco and his daughter filed claims under the FTCA,
alleging that Monaco's cancer and his daughter's birth defect
were caused by Monaco's exposure to radiation while he was
serving in the military. 270 The district court dismissed the ac-
tions, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Feres.27 1
The court found that Monaco's injuries and his daughter's
birth defects were the result of activities incident to his service
and therefore were barred by Feres.272 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal,273 stating that "[t]he Feres doctrine today
stands on shaky ground with its precise justification some-
what confused. ' 274 The court further stated that "[t]he result
in this case disturbs us, particularly with respect to [the





-9 Id Arterio-venous anomaly in the brain is the intrauterine development of the
brain's arteries and veins which is abnormal with reference to form, structure, or posi-
tion. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 90, 123 (1981). The condition in-
duced three brain hemorrhages, aphasia and other permanent damage to the
daughter. 661 F.2d at 130.
27, 661 F.2d at 130. See generally L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
(1982)(general review of the procedures involved in handling FTCA suits).
21 661 F.2d at 130-31.
2 Id. at 134.
.1 Id at 134.
21 Id See also Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that the
"Feres doctrine clearly lives, although its theoretical bases remain subject to serious
doubt").
2,., 661 F.2d at 134. In the daughter's case the court stated that "avoiding examina-
tion of events long past [military orders], and involving her behavior in no respect,
appears to be complete denial of recovery." Id.
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"unfortunately" felt bound by the Feres doctrine,276 but it en-
couraged the daughter to pursue any legislative channels
available to her.277
A result contrary to the Monaco decision was reached by a
United States district court in H'nkie v. United States. 78  In
Hinkie a serviceman was exposed to radiation from nuclear
testing being conducted by the United States Army in Ne-
vada during 1955.279 The plaintiffs, two sons of the service-
man, alleged that their father's exposure to radiation while in
the Army caused their various birth defects.28 ° The district
court allowed the plaintiffs to bring an action under the
FTCA despite the Feres doctrine.2 8' The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, however, reversed stating that "[W]e are
forced once again to decide a case where 'we sense the injus-
tice . . . of [the] result' but where nevertheless we have no
legal authority, as an intermediate appellate court to decide
276 Id See Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1980). The court in
Veillette observed the anomalies created by the judicially made exceptions to the
FTCA. The court concluded that "[n]onetheless, unless Congress acts to limit or abro-
gate the Fetes doctrine, we must continue to draw a line between military personnel
and civilians. ... Id. at 507.
2, 661 F.2d at 134.
2- 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Penn. 1981).
-9 Id at 278.
- Id. at 279. The sons alleged that their father's exposure to radiation caused a
breakage in the chromosomes and various chromosomal alterations such as inversions
and partial displacement not amounting to total breakage of the chromosomes. This
alteration of the father's chromosomes caused the various birth defects in the two sons.
Id
Id2 Id at 284-85. The court did not attempt to distinguish Feres, but rather consid-
ered the three underlying principles supporting the Feres doctrine. Id at 282-84. First,
the court considered the fact that the FTCA applies the law of the state where the act
or omission occurred which caused the injury. Id. at 282-83. The court found that the
two sons' relationship with the government was simply not federal in character and
concluded that the first of the Feres policies did not apply. Id. at 283. Second, the
court considered the availability of benefits under other acts of Congress. Id. at 283-84.
The court noted that it was doubtful that the father would have any claim for chromo-
somal damages and the two sons had no claims at all for other benefits. Id Thus, the
court concluded that the second Fetes factor was "inadequate" for barring the sons'
claim. Id at 284. Then the court considered the effects that allowing the claim would
have on military discipline. Id. The court noted that claims by civilians subject mili-
tary orders to second guessing and are not barred under the FTCA. Id. The court
concluded that the adverse effect on military discipline by itself did not warrant dis-
missal of the claim. Id.
the case differently. '28 2 The court felt foreclosed from any
other option because of the controlling precedent, Feres.283
The Third Circuit presents a good example of the tension
that Feres has caused within a circuit. In Peluso v. United
States,284 the death of a serviceman resulted from the alleged
negligent diagnosis of an abdominal condition. 285 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he case [Feres] [was]
controlling. '286 The court conceded that only the Supreme
Court could reverse Feres but noted that it "would welcome
that result. 28 7
In 1980, another interesting case had reached the Third
Circuit,Jafe v. Untied States.28 Jaffee, an army officer, was
stationed in Nevada during 1953.289 Jaffee was ordered to
stand in an open field while nuclear tests were conducted
close by, resulting in Jaffee's exposure to radiation.2 ° Jaffee
alleged that his exposure to radiation while in the military
caused his inoperable breast cancer. 29'  He brought suit
against the United States and individual military officers, not
under the FTCA but rather alleging an "intentional tort of
human experimentation conducted without military author-
ity . . . in wilful violation of his constitutional [due process]
rights. '292 The district court dismissed the action holding
that Feres was an absolute bar of suits against the govern-
ment and military officers for wilful violation of constitu-
tional rights as well as negligence.293 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, reversed stating that "[the] Feres
*22 Hinkie v. U.S., 715 F.2d 96, 97 (1983).
283 Id at 99.
,", 474 F.2d 605 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973).
285 Id. at 606. The serviceman's death was the result of "acute peritonitis following a
ruptured appendix which allegedly was improperly diagnosed and treated from Au-
gust 23, 1970, to September 4, 1970." Id
28M Id.
2"1 Id The court also stated that "[c]ertainly the facts pleaded here, if true, cry out
for a remedy." Id
2- No. 70-1014 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 1980), vacated, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981).
- Jaffee v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979).
- Id at 632-33.
- Id. at 633.
2,2 id
- Id at 635.
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opinion simply cannot be read, as the district court read it to
suggest an absolute intra-military immunity from liability
for intentional torts. '294 The Third Circuit's decision caused
one commentator to ask whether the "Feres doctrine was at
the cliff's edge. '295 It was believed thatJaffee had created a
direct conflict over whether Feres provided an absolute or
limited intra-military immunity between the circuits which
the Supreme Court would have to resolve.296 The promise
thatJaffee would provide the Supreme Court with the oppor-
tunity to reevaluate the Fetes doctrine did not last long, how-
ever, because the Third Circuit reversed itself after
rearguments in 1980.297 The Third Circuit reconsidered the
Fetes decision and its application to the FTCA in order to
determine how the United States Supreme Court would de-
cide the issue of an intra-military immunity for intentional
constitutional torts 9.29  The court concluded that, for the
same reasons that Feres barred FTCA actions by servicemen
injured incident to their service, claims for intentional consti-
tutional torts should also be barred. 299
V. CONCLUSIONS
The doctrine of intra-military tort immunity needs clarifi-
cation.3 ° Many courts and commentators have attacked the
underlying factors supporting Fetes, and only the concern for
military discipline retains any substantial validity. °' In fact,
the Supreme Court has twice held that military discipline is
the most important factor.3 2 Thus, any modification or clar-
ification of Feres must focus on the effects which allowing
No. 70-1044 slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. 1981) vacated, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981).
- Reed, Jafe v. United States. Fees Doctrine at The Chi"s Edge?, 42 U. Pirr. L. REV.
115, 126 (1980).
- Id at 115-16.
-1 Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (vacating No. 70-1014 (3rd
Cir. Feb. 20, 1980)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
Id at 1230-38.
Id at 1235-37, 1239-40.
:' See supra text accompanying notes 210-299.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 274-
276, 286-287.
:1)2 See supra text accompanying notes 159, 203-206.
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claims of servicemen under the FTCA for injuries resulting
from activities incident to service will have on military disci-
pline.3 °3 In attempting to clarify Feres, the Court should
strive to derive a workable definition of "incident to serv-
ice. ' '3°0 The definition of "incident to servce' should include
those things that are traditionally military in nature such as
war games and battlefield training because those are the ac-
tivities during which the need for military discipline is at its
peak.3 °5 Any definition, however, should exclude activities of
the military having analogous counterparts in the private
sector like traditional doctor and patient relationships, land-
lord and tenant relationships, and negligent maintenence of
various forms of equipment because the connection that these
relationships and situations, although carried out by the mili-
tary, have to military discipline are tenuous at best.30 6 The
effects on military discipline should be the focus - not military
discipline in and of itself.
As an alternative to defining "incident to service," the
Court should consider the existing exceptions to the FTCA
and how they apply to the military to determine whether
most of the concerns for military discipline are not already
protected by these provisions without relying on Feres .307 The
discretionary function exception to the FTCA might be read
as covering situations when military personnel are forced to
make discretionary judgments, whereas situations such as
routine service of an aircraft would fall outside the excep-
tion. 0 If the Court were able to dispell its fears concerning
FTCA actions by servicemen injured incident to their service
by looking solely at the FTCA and its expressed exceptions,
the Court will avoid being accused of ignoring the legitimate
concern of providing servicemen a fair and full compensation
when they are injured. 0 9
See supra text accompanying notes 247-249.
SId
o See supra text accompanying notes 220-224.
6 .d
-'7 See supra text accompanying notes 50-64.
- Id.
." See supra text accompanying notes 224-226, 233-240.
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